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Abstract—Finite state machines (FSMs) are the backbone of 
sequential circuit design. In this paper, a new FSM watermarking 
scheme is proposed by making the authorship information a 
non-redundant property of the FSM. To overcome the 
vulnerability to state removal attack and minimize the design 
overhead, the watermark bits are seamlessly interwoven into the 
outputs of the existing and free transitions of state transition graph 
(STG). Unlike other transition-based STG watermarking, pseudo 
input variables have been reduced and made functionally 
indiscernible by the notion of reserved free literal. The assignment 
of reserved literals is exploited to minimize the overhead of 
watermarking and make the watermarked FSM fallible upon 
removal of any pseudo input variable. A direct and convenient 
detection scheme is also proposed to allow the watermark on the 
FSM to be publicly detectable. Experimental results on the 
watermarked circuits from the ISCAS’89 and IWLS’93 
benchmark sets show lower or acceptably low overheads with 
higher tamper resilience and stronger authorship proof in 
comparison with related watermarking schemes for sequential 
functions. 
 
Index Terms— IP Protection, IP Watermarking, Sequential 
Design, Finite State Machine, State Transition Graph. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As reuse-based design methodology has taken hold, the 
VLSI design industry is confronted with the increasing threat of 
intellectual property (IP) infringement. IP providers are in 
pressing need of a convenient means to track the illegal 
redistribution of the sold IPs. An active approach to protect a 
VLSI design against IP infringement is by embedding a 
signature that can only be uniquely generated by the IP author 
into the design during the process of its creation. When a forgery 
is suspected, the signature can be recovered from the 
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misappropriated IP to serve as undeniable authorship proof in 
front of a court. Such a copyright protection method is widely 
known as watermarking. It is cheaper and more effective than 
patenting or copyrighting by law to deter IP piracy [1]. 
Unlike the digital content in the media industry, a VLSI IP is 
developed in several levels of design abstraction with the help of 
many sophisticated electronic design automation tools. Each 
level of design abstraction involves solving some NP-complete 
optimization problems to satisfy a set of design constraints. In 
the regime of constraint-based watermarking, the signature to be 
imprinted is converted into a set of extra constraints to be 
extraneously satisfied by the watermarked design [2]. The 
watermark embedded at a higher level of design abstraction must 
survive the posterior optimizations so that the same IP 
distributed at all lower abstraction levels are protected. From the 
authorship verification perspective, IP watermarking can be 
classified into static watermarking and dynamic watermarking 
[3]. In the watermark detection phase, static watermarking [4]-[8] 
requires the downstream design to be reverse engineered to the 
level where the watermark is embedded to show the additional 
constraints generated by the author’s signature are satisfied. 
Reverse engineering is expensive and intrusive as some critical 
design data used to produce the watermarked IP may be exposed 
in this process. On the other hand, dynamic watermarking 
[9]-[17] enables the embedded information to be detected from 
the output without reverse engineering by running the protected 
design with a specific code sequence. Dynamic watermarking is 
typically performed in the state transition graph (STG) of finite 
state machine (FSM) [11]-[14], in the architectural level of 
digital signal processors (DSP) [9], [10] or at the 
design-for-testability (DfT) stage [15]-[17]. FSM watermarking 
embeds the signature at a higher (behavioral/RT) level of design 
abstraction whereas the latter normally embeds the signature 
after logic synthesis. Embedding the watermark at the behavioral 
level has the advantage that it is harder for the attacker to erase 
the watermark in the downstream design by simple redundancy 
removal or logic manipulation, but it is also challenging to keep 
the overhead of watermarked design low.  
In this paper, a new dynamic watermarking scheme is 
proposed. The watermark is embedded in the state transitions of 
FSM at the behavioral level. As an FSM design is usually 
specified by an STG or other behavioral descriptions that can be 
easily translated into STG, the watermark is embedded into the 
STG of any size and remains a property of FSM after the 
watermarked design is synthesized and optimized into circuit 
netlist. The authorship can be directly verified even after the 
downstream integrated circuit design processes by running the 
watermarked FSM with a specific code sequence. Unlike [12], 
our watermark verification is simple and efficient even for large 
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designs. On the other hand, as extracting the STG from a gate 
level netlist is computationally impractical for large circuits [11], 
there are limited options for an attacker to remove or hide the 
watermark from the watermarked design netlist or netlist 
obtained by reverse engineering its downstream design [13]. The 
proposed watermarking scheme is robust against state reduction 
attacks. It is different from other transition-based embedding 
methods [13], [14] in that it has lower embedding overhead and 
has overcome the vulnerability of auxiliary inputs which are 
inevitably introduced if the embedding capacity is limited, 
especially for completely specified FSM.  The weaknesses of 
existing FSM watermarking scheme to be overcome in this paper 
are discussed in the next section. Currently there is no easy way 
to publicly detect the existence of watermark, once the FSM is 
integrated into a chip and packaged [11]-[14]. Since the test 
signals can be traced after the chip is packaged and the scan path 
provides controlled accesses to all internal states and 
combinational circuits of the watermarked IP, this paper also 
proposes an alternative approach to allow the authorship proof of 
watermarked FSM to be verified off chip by making it a part of 
the test kernel. The proposed watermarking scheme thus makes 
the authorship proof harder to erase and the IP authorship easier 
to verify.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we discuss related works. Our new FSM watermarking scheme 
is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we analyze the 
resilience of the proposed watermarking method. Section V 
presents experimental results on benchmark designs. Finally, 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
II.   RELATED WORKS 
 
The notion of constraint-based watermarking, first proposed 
by Hong and Potkonjak, [2] has now been widely applied to 
embed authorship signature into VLSI designs developed at 
different design abstraction levels, such as architectural level  [9], 
[10], combinational logic synthesis level [4]-[7] and physical 
placement and routing [8]. At behavior level, STG 
representation makes watermarking FSMs in industrial designs 
promising as efficient sequential logic synthesis tools and 
optimization methods are available to lower the cost of 
embedding and detection of watermark. FSM watermarking has 
the advantage that the IP author signature can be lucidly 
recovered by applying a verification code sequence. As the STG 
is in general exponentially larger than the circuit description 
itself [12], it is computationally impractical to analyze the circuit 
to extract the STG. Such scheme therefore has high resilience 
against tampering at lower abstraction levels.  
An FSM is characterized by a set of internal states and 
transitions between them. Approaches to FSM watermarking 
can be classified based on whether the authorship information is 
embedded in the states [11], [12] or on the transitions [13], [14]. 
In [12], the FSM is watermarked by introducing redundancy in 
the STG so that some exclusively generated circuit properties are 
exhibited to uniquely identify the IP author. According to the 
watermark, a specific sequence of states is generated and will 
only be traversed with the excitation of a specific sequence of 
inputs. The watermark verification relies on the presence of such 
extraneous states in the STG. However, the watermark will not 
survive upon removal of all redundant states by the application 
of a state minimization program [18]-[20]. Watermarking on the 
states of FSM is thus vulnerable to state optimization attacks. 
Two possible ways to verify the presence of a watermark are 
provided in [12]. The implicit BDD-based enumeration method 
is too slow for large circuits. The ATPG-based method requires 
the solution of an NP-complete problem and is not evident that 
the verification can be carried out efficiently on large circuits. 
The properties of the transitions in FSM can also be explored 
for watermark embedding. An FSM watermarking scheme was 
proposed in [13] by inserting redundant transitions into the 
original STG after the unspecified transitions in the STG are 
searched and associated with the user-defined input/output 
sequence. The weakness of this scheme is the monotonous use of 
only the unspecified transitions with the specified outputs of 
STG for watermark insertion. The embedding capacity is limited 
by the number of free input combinations. For FSMs with 
limited unspecified transitions, the probability of coincidence is 
high. If the watermark length is increased beyond the available 
number of unspecified transitions to boost the authorship proof, 
the overhead aggravates rapidly.  
To increase the robustness of FSM watermarking, besides 
the unspecified transitions, existing transitions are also utilized 
in an output mapping algorithm to watermark the FSM [14]. This 
method takes advantage of the original transitions in the STG to 
lower the overhead of watermarking. The embedding process is 
fast as no special effort is made to search the states of STG. The 
watermark bits are embedded at large by a random walk of the 
STG. When all output bits of an existing transition of a visited 
node coincide with a substring of the watermark, that transition 
is automatically watermarked. Otherwise, extra watermarked 
transition will be added to the STG. When the number of outputs 
of FSM increases or when the FSM is completely specified, 
output coincidence of existing transition with the watermark bits 
becomes rare. The watermarked FSM is susceptible to removal 
attack if the ratio of augmented transitions to coinciding 
transitions is high. When only unspecified transitions are 
watermarked, the scheme becomes as vulnerable as [13]. If no 
unspecified transitions are available for watermarking, a pseudo 
input variable is added. This input variable is assigned a fixed 
logic value of “0” for all existing transitions, and a fixed “1” for 
the added transitions. This discrimination between the existing 
transitions and added transitions is conspicuous. Moreover, the 
addition of new input variables with fixed assignments on all 
transitions increases the decoder logics and hence the overhead 
of watermarked FSM significantly. Removal of the pseudo 
inputs can easily eliminate or corrupt the watermark without 
affecting the FSM functionality.  
In what follow, a more robust technique of transition-based 
FSM watermarking is proposed to overcome the shortcomings 
of the above methods. Provision is also made to facilitate the 
FSM watermark to be readily verified off-chip through the scan 
chain.  
III. FINITE STATE MACHINE WATERMARKING 
 
A. Preliminaries 
A formal definition of an FSM is given in [19] as follows: 
Definition 1: An FSM is a tuple M = (Σ, Δ, Q, s0, δ, λ), where 
Σ and Δ are finite, non-empty sets of the input and output 
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alphabets, respectively. Q is a finite, non-empty set of states and 
s0 ∈ Q represents a unique reset state. δ(s, X): Q × Σ → Q ∪{∅} 
is the state transition function and λ(s, X): Q × Σ = Δ ∪{τ} is the 
output function, where ∅ denotes an unspecified state and τ 
denotes an unspecified output. 
For si, sj ∈ Q, sj is said to be the next state of si if  ∃X ∈ Σ s.t. 
sj = δ(si, X). The application of X on si also produces an output, Y 
= λ(si, X) ∈ Δ. For an FSM with n input and k output variables, 
each input alphabet, X
 
 =  x1 x2 … xn, is a string of n bits and each 
output alphabet, Y = y1 y2 … yk, is a string of k bits. Each bit of X 
and Y, xi, yi ∈ {0, 1, −}, where “0” and “1” are the binary 
constants, and “−” denotes a “don’t care” value. To avoid 
unnecessary notational complexity, we use an upper case letter 
to denote an input or output alphabet in Σ and Δ, a lower case 
letter to denote an input or output variable in {0, 1, −}, and yi,j to 
address the j-th bit of the i-th alphabet, Yi. 
FSMs are usually designed with their state transition graph 
(STG). An STG, STG(M) = G(V, E), is a labeled directed graph 
of a machine M of V nodes and E edges. Each symbolic state, s ∈ 
Q, is represented by a node in V. A state transition t from a 
source node S(t) to a destination node D(t) is represented by a 
directed edge, eij ∈ E, connecting S(t) to D(t). Each edge is 
tagged with an input/output label, I(t)/O(t), to encapsulate the 
relations, D(t)
 
= δ(S(t), I(t)) and O(t) = λ(S(t), I(t)). Thus, a state 
transition t can be represented by a quadruple (S(t), D(t), I(t), 
O(t)). The input combinations that are absent from all transitions 
of a source state in an STG are called the free (or unspecified) 
input combinations of that state, and a transition that can be 
created from the free input combinations is called an unspecified 
transition. Unlike [12], as the number of states in an FSM is a 
dominant factor of the implementation complexity, we modify 
only the properties of the edge set to synthesize the watermarked 
design in order to preserve the nodes in STG(M). 
In light of dynamic watermarking, the watermark detection 
process involves the abstraction of an output sequence, ˆY = 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , , }NY Y Y  ,
 
ˆ
iY ∈Δ , from the watermarked design ˆM  by 
applying a specific input sequence, ˆX = 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , , }NX X X  ,
  
ˆ
iX ∈ Σ, on a state, ŝ ∈ Q, such that ( )ˆ ˆˆ,sλ=Y X  = 
( )( )( )( )1 1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ, , ,N Ns X X Xλ δ δ δ −    . The watermark synthesis 
process requires that the outputs of ˆM  be compatible with the 
outputs of M for every input symbol, X ∈ Σ, and output 
mappings of ˆM for every input symbol, ˆ iX  ∈ Σ ∀i = [1, N], be 
dictated by a signature that identifies the ownership of a design. 
The signature is cryptographically generated with a secret key so 
that ( )ˆ ˆˆ,sλ=Y X  becomes a unique property of ˆM . 
 In [13], [14], the length N of ˆX
 
and ˆY  is equal to m/k, 
where m is the watermark length and k is the number of output 
variables of an FSM. Fig. 1(a) shows an example of a STG with 
three states, S1, S2 and S3. The state transitions are determined by 
a 1-bit input variable and a 3-bit output variable, i.e., n = 1 and k 
= 3. When the scheme in [14] is applied to embed an 8-bit 
watermark sequence “10101000”, three (m/k = 3) consecutive 
transitions will be searched to match the watermark bits with the 
output bits. If the search starts from S1, as all transitions from S1 
have no output coinciding with the first three watermark bits of 
“101”, a new transition will be inserted. Since S1 has no free 
input combination, a new input variable is introduced. This input 
variable is assigned to “0” for all existing transitions and “1” for 
all added transitions, and the bits are underlined in Fig. 1(b). A 
new transition (S1, S2, 11, 101) from S1 is added with an 
arbitrarily chosen next state S2 as indicated by the bold dashed 
arc in Fig. 1(b). As S2 has no edge with output bits coinciding 
with “010”, another new transition (S2, S3, 01, 010) is added with 
the randomly selected next state S3. The existing transition (S3, 
S1, 10, 001), printed bold in Fig. 1(b), has an output matching 
with the watermark bits “00”. So it is reused for watermarking.  
The watermarked design synthesized by SIS [23] has 640 units 
of area, 7.2 units of delay and 201.8 units of power. Comparing 
with the original design with 448, 6 and 178 units of area, delay 
and power, respectively, the FSM watermarked by [14] incurs 
42.9%, 20% and 13.4% overheads in area, delay and power, 
respectively.  
In this example, the output is a 3-bit (k = 3) alphabet. The 
probability of the output of a transition coinciding with the 
watermark bits is as low as 1/8, which results in only one out of 
three existing transitions being used for watermarking. When k 
is larger, it becomes more difficult to make use of existing 
transitions to reduce the overhead of watermarking due to the 
low probability of output coincidence. The fixed assignment of 
the added input variable also increases the design complexity. 
Moreover, as all output bits are watermarked in consecutive 
transitions after the starting state on which ˆX  is applied, as 
shown in Fig. 1(c), the watermarked transitions are not well 
obfuscated, causing the watermarked FSM to be vulnerable. 
To overcome these problems, we make N > m/k so that not all 
bits in ˆY
 
are watermarked. The locality of the watermark is 
randomized by a cryptographic one-way function such that any 
number (from 1 to k) of bits at any output bit from any transition 
of STG is probable to be watermarked. The general idea can be 
illustrated using the same STG example in Fig. 1(a). Since N > 
8/3, it is set to 8. The localities of these 8 watermark bits are 
randomly generated between [1, k×N = 24] without replication. 
Suppose these numbers are {9, 13, 2, 10, 20, 23, 17, 4}. So, eight 
transitions will be sought to produce an output sequence that 
contains the watermark sequence “10101000” at these bit 
positions in the output. As the 8 watermark bits are dispersed 
into 8 transitions, the probability of the output of an existing 
transition coinciding with the watermark bit is as high as 1/2, 
which results in five existing transitions being reused for 
watermarking and only one new transition is added, as shown in 
Fig. 1(d). As the newly added transition is well blent with the 
existing transitions, when ˆX is applied on the FSM to detect the 
watermark, it is hard for an attacker to differentiate it from others, 
as indicated by the bold arrow in Fig. 1(e). To increase the 
watermark strength and minimize the next state decoder logic of 
watermarked design, we also capitalize on the extra headroom 
created by the pseudo input variables and free input 
combinations of the FSM. In Fig. 1(d), when a new input 
variable is introduced, it does not need to be fixed and it can 
remain as don’t care in the final watermarked design if it is not 
used for the generation of any new transitions. The synthesized 
design from Fig. 1(d) has 520, 6.4 and 190.2 units of area, delay 
and power, respectively. The overheads due to watermarking are 
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only 16.1% on area, 6.7% on timing and 6.9% on power. The 
advantage over [14] is discernible.  
With these preliminaries, our proposed FSM watermarking 
algorithm will be elaborated next.  
 
B. Generation of Watermark and Random Sequence. 
A meaningful text string, MSG is first encoded into a binary 
string and then encrypted by a provable cryptographic algorithm 
with the secret key Ke of the IP owner. If the length of the 
encrypted message is too long, a message digest (MD) algorithm 
can be used to reduce its length. The resultant binary bit vector 
of length m is the watermark, { } 1mi iW w ==  and wi ∈ {0,1}.  
                        (a)                                                (b) 
                       (c)                                                  (d) 
       (e) 
Fig. 1. Watermark embedding on transitions of STG: (a) original STG, (b) 
watermarked STG by the scheme in [14], (c) excitation of watermarked 
transitions of STG in (b), (d) watermarked STG by proposed scheme, (e) 
excitation of watermarked transitions of  STG in (d).  
                         
A keyed one-way pseudorandom number generator (PNG) is 
used to generate a sequence, { } 1mi iB b == , of m unique integers 
between 1 and Ν ×k, i.e., bi ∈[1, Ν ×k] ∀i = 1, 2, … , m and bi ≠ 
bj ∀i≠ j. The length N of sequence ˆX
 
is determined empirically. 
The purpose of B is to randomly disperse the m watermark bits 
into ˆY . If ∃(i, j) ∀i ∈ [1, N] and j ∈ [1, k] such that (i−1)k + j = 
bl , then 
,
ˆi j ly w= , where ,ˆi jy
 
is the j-th bit of ˆ ˆiY ∈ Y . The 
secure hash algorithm SHA-1 [21] can be used as an MD as well 
as in a keyed one-way PNG for the generation of these two 
random sequences, W and B. As it is computationally infeasible 
to find a collision of this hash function, the possibility that the 
same group of numbers is generated by coincidence is extremely 
low without the knowledge of the secret key.   
    
C. Watermarking Insertion 
The watermark W is inserted into STG(M) by modifying 
some of its edges without changing the operational behavior of 
M to find a sequence of N consecutive transitions, 
( )1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,i i i i it s s X Y+= , i = 1, 2, … , N, such that each watermark bit, wl 
∈ W, l ∈ [1, m], will be randomly mapped to one bit in the 
sequence, ˆY = 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆNYY Y  = 1,1 1, 2,1 2, ,1 ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆk k N N ky y y y y y        . 
The mapping from W to ˆY is injective but not surjective.
 
The 
value of each bit 
,
ˆi jy  in ˆY  can be determined as follows: if 
(i–1)k + j = bl , then 
,
ˆi j ly w= , else ,ˆi jy = “−” , as shown in Fig. 2. 
Given an output ˆiY  and a source state ˆis , the destination 
state 1ˆis +
 
of watermarked transition ˆit  will be determined by an 
output compatibility check. Two bits, x, y ∈{0, 1, −}, are 
compatible if they are of equal value or one of them has a don’t 
care value, i.e., x ∩ y ≠ ∅. This intersection of two ternary 
variables is defined in Table I. Likewise, two alphabets, X and Y 
are compatible, denoted by X ≡ Y, if none of the elements in X ∩ 
Y  = {xi ∩ yi} has a null value.  
Generate ˆY (W, B) { 
{ },ˆ ˆi jy=Y ,
 
 i∈[1, N],  j∈[1, k];  
for (i = 1 to N) { 
    for (j = 1 to k) { 
          
,
ˆi jy = −; 
          for (l = 1 to m) { 
                if  ((i–1)k + j = bl) { 
                     
,
ˆi j ly w= ;
 
                      break; }  





Fig. 2. Generation of watermarked output sequence. 
TABLE I  Intersection of two ternary variables 
∩ 0 1 
− 
0 0 ∅ 0 





Starting with i = 1, an arbitrary state, 1sˆ ∈ Q, is selected. Let 
T( ˆis ) be the set of transitions emanating from a state, ˆis . A set 
of transitions C( ˆis ) that is output compatible with ˆiY  is sought, 
i.e., C( ˆis ) = {ti ∈ T( ˆis )| O(ti) ≡ 1ˆY }. To avoid entering into a 
deadlock, transitions terminated at a deadlock state (i.e., state 
with no fanout) are excluded from C( ˆis ). Four distinct scenarios 
are considered for the determination of ˆit .  
Cases 1: There is only one output compatible transition, 
|C( ˆis )| = 1, then ˆit  = C( ˆis ) and 1ˆis + = D( ˆit ). 
Case 2: If more than one output compatible transition are 
found, i.e., |C( ˆis )| > 1, then a transition from C( ˆis ), with the 
next state having the highest number of free input combinations, 
will be selected as ˆit . Its output will be modified to O( ˆit ) = O( ˆit ) 
∩ 
ˆ
iY  and 1ˆis +  = D( ˆit ). 
Case 3: If |C( ˆis )| = 0, then the free input combinations of 
ˆis will be considered. Let F( ˆis ) = {X ∈ Σ | δ( ˆis , X) = ∅} be the 
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set of free input combinations of ˆis . For ˆ( )iF s ≠ ∅ , let D( ˆis ) = 
{ ˆ js ∈ Q | ˆ js = D( ˆit ) ∀ ˆit ∈ T( ˆis )} be the set of all destination 
states of ˆis . 1ˆis +  is set to the state with the highest number of 
free input combinations in D( ˆis ) (excluding the deadlock states) 
unless D( ˆis ) = ∅. When D( ˆis ) = ∅, 1ˆis +  is set to the state with 
the highest number of free input combinations in STG(M). If 
there exists an edge connecting ˆis  to 1ˆis +  in STG(M), a new 
input/output pair, I( ˆit )/O( ˆit ), is added for the transition ˆit . 
Otherwise, a new edge directed from ˆis  to 1ˆis + labeled with 
I( ˆit )/O( ˆit ) will be created in STG(M) for ˆit , and O( ˆit ) = ˆiY
 
. The 
determination of I( ˆit ) will be explained later. 
Case 4: If |C( ˆis )| = 0 and F( ˆis ) = ∅, then a pseudo input 
variable xn+1 needs to be introduced in M and the number of 
input variables n is incremented by 1. xn+1 is set to an unspecified 
logic value “∗” for all existing transitions. A new edge directed 
from ˆis  to 1ˆis +  labeled with I( ˆit )/O( ˆit ) will be created for ˆit . 
1ˆis +  is set to the state with the highest number of free inputs in 
D( ˆis ) or in STG(M) if D( ˆis ) = ∅, and O( ˆit ) = ˆiY . Both symbols 
“*” and “−” can assume either a logic “0” or a logic “1” value but 
there is a subtle difference. “−” is meant for the currently used 
input combinations whereas “*” can be associated with either the 
used or free input combinations. A “*” can be construed as a 
reserved free input literal as its logic state (“0” or “1”) will only 
be defined at the time when some input combinations subsumed 
by it are freed to become I( ˆit ). 
 
Find ˆit (Q, i, ˆM , ˆY , ˆis ) { 
   if  (|C( ˆis )| = 1)  {                           // case 1 
ˆ
it  = C( ˆis ); 1ˆis + = D( ˆit ); 
      } else if  |C( ˆis )|>1 {                       // case 2 
      
ˆ
it  = T(arg{max(F(sj))}) ∀ sj
 
∈D( ˆis ) and T(sj) ∈ C( ˆis );  
O( ˆit ) = O( ˆit ) ∩ ˆiY  ; 1ˆis +  = D( ˆit ); 
} else {                                   
if  ( ˆ( )iF s ≠ ∅ ) {                               // case 3  
      if ( D( ˆis ) ≠ ∅ ) 1ˆis + = arg{max(F(sj))} ∀ sj ∈D( ˆis ); 
  else  1ˆis + = arg{max(F(sj))} ∀ sj ∈ Q;   
              } else {                                                // case 4 
 Add a pseudo input variable, xn+1; 
    for (each tˆ ∈ ˆM )  I ( tˆ )n+1 = *;   // set xn+1 to * 
      n = n +1;  
      if ( D( ˆis ) ≠ ∅ ) 1ˆis + = arg{max(F(sj))} ∀ sj ∈D( ˆis ); 
     else  1ˆis + = arg{max(F(sj))} ∀ sj ∈ Q;   
} 
O( ˆit ) = ˆiY ; 
  I( ˆit ) = Find ˆ( )iI t (n, ˆM , ˆis );  
} 
return ˆit ; 
} 
Fig. 3. Determination of watermarked transition. 
 
The pseudo codes for the determination of watermarked 
transitions are shown in Fig. 3. The input alphabets for the 
watermarked transitions found in Cases 3 and 4 are determined 
by the subroutine Find shown in Fig. 4. 
When there is no existing transition with compatible output, 
as in Cases 3 and 4, the input alphabet I( ˆit ) for O( ˆit ) = λ( ˆis , 
I( ˆit )) = ˆiY
 
needs to be determined.  I( ˆit ) is set to one of the free 
input combinations of ˆis  if no “*” appears in all the used input 
combinations of ˆis . Otherwise, an alphabet, X ∈ I(tu), tu ∈ T( ˆis ), 
that contains at least one “*” from the set of used input 
combinations of ˆis will be split into two. Initially, I( ˆit ) = X. A 
“*” bit in X is selected and assigned a fixed but randomly 
generated binary constant, a ∈ {0, 1}, while the corresponding 
“*” bit in I( ˆit ) is assigned its complement a . Meantime, all the 
“−” bits in I( ˆit ) are replaced by the “*” bits.  For example, if X = 
“1−*” and a = 0, then it will be split into X = “1−0” and I( ˆit ) = 
“1*1”. As the number of transitions with “*” bits in the pseudo 
input variable space enormously outnumbers those in the 
original input variable space, to simplify the next state and 
output decoder design, it is lucrative to preserve “*” in the 
pseudo input variable space whenever free input combinations 
from the original variable space can be used to produce I( ˆit ). In 
the search for the next state 1ˆis +  an input alphabet with j 
exclusive “*” bits is considered as a cover of 2j−1 free input 
combinations. When two states possess the same highest number 
of free input combinations, preference will be given to the state 
that covers the highest number of output combinations in its fan 
out transitions.   
 
Find ˆ( )iI t (n, ˆM , ˆis ) { 
     if  (* is absent in all X ∈ F( ˆis ))  ˆ( )iI t = any X ∈ F( ˆis ); 
else { 
  Select X ∈ I(tu) with  tu ∈ T( ˆis ) and ∃Xk = * for 1 ≤ k ≤ n; 
    Set ˆ( )iI t = X; 
a = random(0,1);  
Xk = a;  ˆ( )i kI t  = a ; 
for ( j = 1 to n)   
if ( ˆ( )i jI t = − )  ˆ( )i jI t = *;  } 
     return ˆ( )iI t ; 
} 
Fig. 4. Finding input alphabet for the watermarked transition. 
 
The above watermarking process is repeated for i = 2 to N 
until ˆNt  is determined. The residual “*” in the input alphabets of 
all edges will be replaced with “−” and the resultant STG(M) is 
the watermarked STG( ˆM ) and ( ) ( ) ( )1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆNI t I t I t=X   . If the 
overhead of watermarked design is not satisfactory, the entire 
process can be repeated with an adjusted value of N. The overall 
watermark insertion process is shown in Fig. 5.  
For each pseudo input variable added, at least 2n−1 potential 
free input combinations are created in every state transition, 
where n here refers to the total number of input variables 
including the pseudo variables. These free input combinations 
have been consumed in [14] by fixing the value of each pseudo 
input variable to be “0” consistently for all existing transitions 
and “1” consistently for the watermarked transition immediately 
upon its creation. This has not only increased the complexity of 
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the decoders, but also made the watermarked transition 
discernible from the pseudo inputs. The introduction of reserved 
free literal allows the assignments of “*” in the input alphabets 
of all transitions to be deferred until some input combinations 
subsumed by it are needed to watermark a transition. The 
transformation of  “−” to “*” in I( ˆit ) when a random assignment 
is made on “*” serves two important purposes. First, it 
judiciously preserves the don’t care inputs in the transitions to 
optimize the design of next state and output decoders. Second, it 
allows the same edge to be revisited for watermarking to 
maximally exploit the free input combinations. This will 
minimize the required number of pseudo input variables, 
especially when a long watermark is to be embedded for a strong 
authorship proof. 
 
FSM_watermarking (M, MSG, m, k, N, Q, Ke) { 
W = { } 1mi iw = = MD(encrypt(MSG, Ke)); 
B= { } 1mi ib = = PNG(Ke, N × k) , bi ∈ [1, N × k] ;  
       
ˆY
 
= Generate ˆY (W, B); 
1sˆ ∈ Q; ˆM =M; 
 for (i = 1 to N) { 
  Find ˆit (Q, i, ˆM , ˆY , ˆis ); 
             
ˆis = D( ˆit ); }        
         for (each transition tˆ ∈ ˆM ) { 
          replace * in I( tˆ ) by −; }     
         return ˆM ; 
   } 
Fig. 5. Algorithm for FSM watermarking. 
 
 The number of transitions N has no bearing on the 
probability of coincidence but it has impact on the cost of 
watermarking. If N is small, the probability of finding 
compatible outputs from existing transitions is low and more 
design overhead will be incurred. On the other hand, if N is large, 
fewer new transitions and pseudo inputs need to be added which 
will lower the cost of watermarking, but the code sequences 
required to detect the watermark is long. To avoid introducing an 
excessive number of unspecified transitions due to the addition 
of pseudo input variables, N needs to be sufficiently larger than 
m/k. When N ≈ m, each output alphabet in ˆY
 
contains one 
watermark bit on average and the resultant watermarked design 
generally possesses acceptably low overhead. As our embedding 
algorithm can run very quickly even for large FSM, the 
watermarking process can be repeated for different N  to select 
the least overhead watermarked design with reasonable 
verification code length. The procedure shown in Fig. 6, is 
suggested to legitimately limit the number of trials. Let 
iwm
A  
denote the area of watermarked FSM with N = Ni at the i-th trial. 
Ni = Ni−1 ± δi and N1 ≈ m. Ni that is incremented (or decremented) 
by δi depends on the extent to which 1iwmA −  is increased (or 
reduced) over the previous trial. The standard deviation, σi, of 




























 is the mean area of trial watermarked 
FSMs. The trial terminates when σi /Α ≤ ε or when N ≥ Nmax, 
where ε is a small preset value, A is the area of FSM before 
watermarking and Nmax is some preset limit on the verification 
code length. The least overhead watermarked design from 
among the trials is selected. 
 
  N_adaptation (A, ε, Nmax, m) { 
    i = 1;  Ni ≈ m; 0wmA = A; N = Ni; 
repeat  { 
      
ˆM = FSM_watermarking (M, MSG, m, k, Ni, Q, Ke); 
       Synthesize ˆM and obtain 
iwm
A ; 







           Ni+1 = Ni + δi; 
       else  
         Ni+1 = Ni − δi; 
       Compute wmA and iσ ; 
       N = Ni ; i = i +1; 
} until σi /Α ≤ ε or N ≥ Nmax; 
return ˆM
 
with  minimum area; 
} 
Fig. 6. Minimization of FSM watermarking overhead by adaptation of N. 
 
D. Watermark Detection 
To verify the authorship, one needs to run the watermarked 
FSM with the input sequence, ˆX = 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , , }NX X X  , applied 
on state 1sˆ . If the operation halts before N transitions, the 
watermark cannot be detected. Otherwise, an output sequence 
Y   of N×k bits is obtained. The bits indexed by the set B of m 
random numbers are selected from Y   to form an ordered 
sequence W  . The authorship is proved if W   perfectly matches 
or is highly correlated with the watermark W of the IP owner.  
Although the ownership can be authenticated directly by 
running the watermarked FSM with ˆX , it does not permit the IP 
authorship to be field authenticated by the IP buyers after the 
watermarked FSM has been implemented into an integrated 
circuit and packaged. Since only the test signals can be traced 
after the chip is packaged, the authorship of the watermarked 
FSM can be verified off chip by making it a part of the test kernel. 
A sequence of test vectors can be applied serially through the 
scan-in, Sin pin to bring ˆM  to the designated state 1sˆ  in the test 
mode, followed by N designated test vectors that incorporate ˆX . 
The output responses Y   can then be collected serially from a 
scan-out Sout  pin externally to verify the authenticity of ˆM . 
This convenient way of watermark verification can be 
performed by the end users provided that scan design is also 
incorporated in the watermarked IP chip.  
Since the scan chain is used as a medium to aid authorship 
verification of the IP encapsulated in the test kernel, it can also 
be independently protected by [16], [17] to boost the confidence 
in positive watermark identification. By watermarking the scan 
chain of watermarked FSM using the techniques proposed in 
[16], [17], the aggressor needs additional effort to also 
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successfully tamper or redesign the test structure to provide the 
fault coverage of the pirated IP. Failure to detect the scan chain 
signature alerts malicious tampering or removal of the test 
structure in attempt to misappropriate the protected IP. 
 
E. An Illustrative Example  
The STG of a simple FSM to be watermarked is shown in Fig. 
7(a). It has five states, represented mnemonically as Q = {s1, s2, 
s3, s4, s5}. Assume that the encrypted watermark W = “110110”. 
The number of output labels to be mapped, N should be greater 
than 6/2 = 3 as m = 6 and k = 2. Let N = 7. Suppose the set of six 
random numbers between 1 and 14 (k×N) generated by the PNG 
with the IP owner’s secret key is B = {9, 4, 2, 7, 12, 3}. 
 
(a)                                                         (b) 
 
                    (c)                                                             (d) 
 
 
                                              (e) 
 
Fig. 7. Example of watermarking on FSM: (a) original FSM, (b) use of existing 
transition, (c) introduction of pseudo input variable and new transition, (d) the 
watermarked FSM, (e) excitation of watermarked transitions.  
Following the algorithm in Fig. 2, since 2(1 – 1) + 1 = 1 ∉ B, 
1,1yˆ = “−”; since 2(1 – 1) + 2 = 2 = b3, 1,2yˆ = w3 = “0”; 3 = b6 
⇒ 2,1yˆ = w6 = “0”; 4 = b2 ⇒ 2,2yˆ = w2 = “1”; 5 ∉ B ⇒ 3,1yˆ = “−”; 6 
∉ B ⇒ 3,2yˆ = “−”; 7 = b4 ⇒ 4,1yˆ = w4 = “1”; 8 ∉ B ⇒ 4,2yˆ = “−”; 9 
= b1 ⇒ 5,1yˆ = w1 = “1”; 10 ∉ B ⇒ 5,2yˆ = “−”; 11 ∉ B ⇒ 6,1yˆ = “−”; 
12 = b5 ⇒ 6,2yˆ = w5 = “1”; 13 ∉ B ⇒ 7,1yˆ = “−” and 14 ∉ B 
⇒ 7 ,2yˆ = “−”. Hence, ˆY = “−0 01 −− 1− 1− −1 −−”. 
An arbitrary starting state, 1sˆ = s1, is selected to commence 
the watermarking process. For 1ˆY = “−0”, C( 1sˆ ) = {s1, s2, s4} and 
none of them has any free input combination. 2sˆ
 
can be set to 
any  state of  C( 1sˆ ), says s1, and 1ˆY  = “00”. 1tˆ  is marked by a 
heavy edge in Fig. 7(b). For 2ˆY = “01”, there is no compatible 
output from T( ˆis ) and C( 1sˆ ) = ∅. Since s3 has the most free 
input combinations among D( 2sˆ ), a new transition from s1 to s3 
is added. As F( 2sˆ ) = ∅, a pseudo input variable, x3, is introduced. 
It assumes a value of “∗” on the inputs of all existing transitions. 
Suppose the input of transition, t = (s1, s3, “10*”, “11”), is split 
into I(t) = “101” and  I( 2tˆ ) = “100”. The new transition, 2tˆ  = (s1, 
s3, 100, 01), is added into the STG(M) as indicated by a dotted 
edge in Fig. 7(c). For 3ˆY = “−−”, C( 3sˆ ) = {s2, s4}. Both states 
have equal number of free input combinations but s4 is preferred 
over s2 as s4 covers more output combinations (“01” and “11”) in 
its fanout transitions than that (“01”) of s2. Therefore, 3tˆ  = (s3, s4, 
“11*”, “10”). The process continues until all seven transitions 
are identified. Then all residual “*” in the final STG are changed 
to “−”. The watermarked STG is shown in Fig. 7(d), where the 
transitions of Cases 1 and 2 are marked by heavy edges and the 
added transitions of Cases 3 and 4 are marked by dotted edges. 
Fig. 7(e) shows the complete watermarked sequence of inputs 
and outputs and the transitional states. The overhead of the 
synthesized watermarked FSM can be checked at this point. N is 
modified and the watermarking process is repeated according to 
Fig. 6 until the terminal criterion is met. 
To verify the existence of watermark W, an input sequence, 
ˆX  = (“01−”, “100”, “11−”, “0−0”, “1−−”, “00−”, “00−”), “−” 
∈{0,1}, is applied on the state s1. A binary stream W   is 
retrieved from the bit positions, 9, 4, 2, 7, 12, 3 of the output 
sequence ˆY . If W   = W = “110110”, the authorship is proved. 
IV.    WATERMARK RESILIENCE ANALYSIS 
A. Authorship Credibility 
The credibility of the authorship proof can be evaluated by 
the probability that an unintended watermark is detected in a 
design [13]. Suppose that an arbitrary input sequence exits to 
excite N’ (N’ ≥ N) consecutive transitions through the reachable 
states of an FSM with k output variables. The output sequence of 
length N’ (each output alphabet has k binary bits) will be one of 
2k×N’ possible solutions. The odds that the output sequence 
contains the identical watermark bits at the positions specified 
by the author’s signature are: 










                                        (2) 
A longer watermark has a lower probability of coincidence. 
As m increases, more new transitions may have to be added. The 
beauty of our method is the input sequence length, N can 
increase to mitigate the overhead increment without 
compromising the authorship credibility. 
The false positive rate, which is the probability that the 
watermark is detected in the output sequence under a different 
random input sequence, can be estimated statistically. If there 
are NC(τ) output sequences detected with at least τ fraction of 
matched watermark bits when NT random input sequences are 
applied, then the false positive rate is determined as: 






τ =                                             (3)  
where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. To constitute a false positive, τ = 1 since all bits 
extracted from the specific positions by the detector need to be 
matched exactly with the watermark bits. As τ reduces, P
λ
 
increases and a threshold of discrimination can be determined 
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empirically that with certain degree of confidence, the 
authenticity of the design can be assured by detecting only a 
fraction of the watermark bits. A suitable error correction 
scheme can also be considered based on P
λ
 to correct the 
partially corrupted output subsequence due to tampering.  
       Pc and Pλ are important to repudiate the denial of authorship. 
To show that the output sequences excited by the verification 
input cannot be obtained by trial-and-error to match the 
watermark, the claimant needs only to demonstrate that the 
watermark and the watermarked positions in the output sequence 
are uniquely generated with a cryptographic one-way function 
using a secret key in his/her possession, provided that Pc is very 
low and P
λ
 is low enough for a sufficiently large number of 
random tests. 
 
B. Resilience Analysis 
 The following conceivable attacks on watermarking of 
sequential circuit designs are analyzed with Alice as the IP 
owner and Bob as the attacker, who attempts to tamper an 
illegally acquired copy of Alice’s watermarked IP.  
 
B.1 Combinational Logic Re-synthesis     
Bob may use various logic optimization tools [22], [23] to 
re-synthesize the combinational logic of watermarked FSM. 
Such combinational logic re-synthesis operation maintains the 
inputs/outputs behaviors of flip-flops in the design and has no 
effect on the STG structure. Therefore, the watermark embedded 
on the STG is robust against attack by combinational logic 
re-synthesis. 
 
B.2 Circuit Retiming     
   Bob may apply retiming transformation [22], [24] to move 
the latches across the combinational logic blocks of Alice’s 
watermarked FSM without changing the design functionality. 
Retiming can change the STG structure. Such transformation 
can be divided into three cases for analysis. (1) Splitting one 
state into two one-step equivalent states. (2) Merging two 
one-step equivalent states into one state. (3) Switching between 
two states that are one-step equivalent. Two states si and sj are 
said to be one-step equivalent if and only if the two states have 
the same outputs and the same next state under the same input 
excitation.  















































Fig. 8. FSM Retiming. 
 
 The consequence of splitting, merging or switching 
transformation on the outputs retrieved in the watermark 
detection process can be analyzed by the STG before and after 
retiming. As an example, let states s31 and s32 be two generic 
one-step equivalent states and the transitions (s1, s31, xt, yt) and 
(s31, s5, xt+1, yt+1) are traversed in the watermarking process as 
shown in Fig. 8. Upon retiming, states s31 and s32 are merged into 
state s3. When the sequence ˆX  is applied onto the retimed FSM, 
transitions (s1, s3, xt, yt) and (s3, s5, xt+1, yt+1) are traversed, the 
same outputs as Alice’s watermarked FSM are generated from 
these two steps. Similarly, splitting or switching operations on 
the watermarked FSM will not prevent the detection of Alice’s 
watermark. Alice’s watermark will not be removed as a state can 
only be substituted by the state with the same behaviors in 
retiming transformation. 
 
B.3 State Recoding (or Assignment) 
 Bob may recode the states of Alice’s watermarked FSM to 
remove her watermark. State assignment changes the mnemonic 
representations of states in Q. It has no effect on the functional 
specification of FSM [25]. As the watermark is embedded in the 
state transitions rather than the states, Alice’s watermark will 
survive the state recoding attack. 
 
B.4 Combinational and Sequential Redundancy Removal 
When a redundant fault is identified in a sequential circuit, 
the part of logic can be deleted to simulate the effect of fault. 
Bob can remove the combinational logic that is not necessary for 
the correct circuit behavior. This attack has similar effect as the 
combinational resynthesis attack as far as the sequential 
behavior is concerned. So it will not affect the embedded 
watermark.  
Elimination of sequential redundancy may change δ and λ 
while maintaining the I/O behaviors. The sequential 
redundancies can be categorized into sequentially non-excitable 
(SNE) and non-distinguishable (ND) faults [26]. An SNE fault is 
a fault that cannot be excited from any reachable state [26]. As 
an SNE fault does not affect the reachable part of STG, removal 
of SNE faults maintains the integrity of reachability information. 
In our watermarking scheme, all states traversed by ˆX  are 
reachable as long as the starting state, 1sˆ  is selected as a 
reachable state after the reset state, s0. This can be easily 
guaranteed. As all IOs on the edges of these reachable states are 
not changed, Alice’s watermark can still be detected upon the 
removal of SNE faults.  
Although an ND fault does not affect the I/O behavior, it may 
change the reachable part of STG. An ND fault can be identified 
by verifying the equivalence between the watermarked circuit 
and the circuit obtained by forcing one node in the circuit to a 
constant value [26]. If they are equivalent, then a stuck-at fault at 
that node is non-detectable and some redundancy can be 
removed. The FSM watermark may be partially erased if the ND 
faults are detected around the circuit corresponding to the added 
transitions in the watermarking process. However, this attack is 
expensive since it requires for each node a computation of 
equivalence between two possibly large sequential circuits. This 
equivalence is obtained by computing the product machine and 
its set of reachable states. Even with the use of implicit STG 
traversal techniques, the applicability of this type of sequential 
redundancy removal is restricted to small circuits. An ND fault 
can be excited, but none of the excitation vectors can be 
extended to a test as its effect can never be observed from any 
primary output.  
 
B.5 State Reduction 
Bob may perform a state reduction on Alice’s watermarked 
FSM based on the identification of sets of compatible states 
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(compatibles) [26], [27]. A set of states is a compatible if and 
only if for each input sequence, there is a corresponding output 
sequence which can be produced by each state in the compatible. 
All outputs in the transitions are preserved in the reduced FSM 
even if the states have been substituted by their compatibles. As 
the watermark is embedded in the transitions instead of the states, 
our FSM watermarking will survive the state reduction operation. 
However, a watermark embedded on the states of STG, as in the 
scheme of [12], is vulnerable to the state reduction operation. 
 
B.6 Transition Elimination 
Bob may try to eliminate some transitions in tˆ . In our 
watermarking scheme, the existing transitions and the added 
transitions are indistinguishably utilized for watermarking. 
There are few added transitions and they are randomly 
interleaved in the watermarked transition sequence, tˆ . There is 
no easy means to eliminate these transitions from the circuit 
netlist without modifying the correct behaviors of FSM. The 
time and effort required for a successful attack is almost as good 
as redesigning the IP function from scratch.  
 
B.7 Removal of Circuitries with Pseudo Inputs 
The pseudo inputs, if any, are documented as part of the test 
or primary inputs in the distributed watermarked IP. Due to their 
random logic assignments, and the high number of don’t cares 
they introduced, they are well camouflaged after the logic 
optimization process. Even if Bob knows about the addition of 
some pseudo inputs, removal of the circuitries connected to 
these pseudo inputs will cause malfunction to the watermarked 
FSM. The conflicts arise because the unspecified transitions 
created by the pseudo inputs can have different outputs or 
destination states under the same input combinations as the 
existing transitions upon the removal of the pseudo inputs. For 
example, in Fig. 7(c), when the pseudo input variable is 
eliminated by the removal of some subcircuits, there will be two 
transitions from state s1 with I/O = 10/11 and 10/01, respectively 
to state s3. This is obviously an output conflict, hence such attack 
is not sustainable. 
 
B.8 Ghost Search  
Without tampering Alice’s design, Bob may claim his 
ownership of Alice’s FSM by specifying some bits in the output 
sequence generated by his own selected input sequence to make 
up his watermark. However, it is computationally infeasible for 
Bob to reverse the PNG to prove that the positions of these 
extracted bits are cryptographically related to his signature. 
Alternatively, he can generate a group of integers with his key 
using a one-way function and then select the bits from these 
positions to extract his watermark. Again, it will be 
computationally infeasible for him to show that the watermark is 
cryptographically associated with a meaningful ownership 
message. It is also computationally impractical for Bob to 
enumerate different sequences of input combinations to match 
his own watermark to the extracted output sequence of Alice’s 
FSM in his chosen bit positions. The number of trials grows 
exponentially with the size of FSM. Depending on Bob’s 
selected bit positions, there is no guarantee that such an input 
sequence can be found even after trying all possible input 
sequences.  
 
B.9 Addition of Watermark 
Bob may embed his own watermark
 
into Alice’s 
watermarked design to claim his ownership, if he has the 
necessary tools and knowledge of the watermarking process.  
Owing to the resilience of the proposed watermarking scheme 
against watermark erasure without changing the properties of 
FSM, even if Bob can succeed in adding his own watermark into 
Alice’s watermarked FSM, Bob’s watermarked design will 
contain Alice’s watermark. Therefore, Alice can still correctly 
retrieve her watermark bits from Bob’s watermarked design but 
the reverse is not possible for Bob.  
If the protected IP is distributed at the gate-level, Bob would 
have to first recover the STG from the netlist, which is 
computationally impractical for large designs [11]. Additionally, 
Bob needs to repeat the entire watermarking and optimization 
process to ensure that the overhead is acceptable. Yet, this 
problem can be solved by using a secure third party (entity), e.g., 
a legal firm or a watermarking governing body. In this case, 
Alice will generate a time-stamped authenticated signature, and 
keep it at an authorized legal firm. This firm will keep a record of 
such signatures and the date it was generated, which can be used 
in front of a court to show the exact time the watermark was 
generated and embedded in any future dispute. The overall IP 




Fig. 9. Watermarking with third party keeping a time-stamped signature. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experimentation is performed on the circuits, which are 
described in KISS2 format [23], from the IWLS’93 benchmark 
set and some FSM designs from the ISCAS’89 benchmark set. 
The FSM watermarking scheme is implemented using the C++ 
language. 64-bit and 128-bit watermarks were embedded into 
each FSM design. Using the SIS [23] tool, state minimization 
and state assignment are carried out on the original and 
watermarked designs. The optimized FSM designs are 
synthesized using the algebraic script from SIS and technology 
mapped to the Mississippi State University standard cell library. 
All experiments were run on a 750MHz Sun UltraSPARC-III 
with Solaris operating system and 2 GB of memory. 
Table II summarizes experimental results conducted on 
ISCAS’89 and IWLS’93 benchmark designs. The columns “|Q|”, 
“n” and “k” are the numbers of states, input variables and output 
variables of each FSM design, respectively. “A” and “D” are the 
area and delay, respectively,of the optimized design as reported 
by SIS [23] before watermarking. “P” is the estimated power in 
μW obtained by using GENERAL delay model [23] with 
20MHz clock and 5V supply. Each design is watermarked with 
the first 64 and 128 bits of SHA-1 hash values of the ownership 
information. Different lengths of verification code sequence, N 
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have been experimented with N1 = 80 and Nmax = 600. δi = 20 
when Ni < 100 and δi = 100 when Ni  ≥ 100. Typically, σi/A 
converges to ε = 0.05 in less than five trials. The value of “N” 
indicated is the one that produces the least area overhead 
watermarked FSM design. For most designs tested, only one 
pseudo input variable is introduced in the watermarking process 
while no pseudo input variable is needed for the designs, “ex4”, 
“ex1” and “sand”. “na” denotes the number of new transitions 
added onto the watermarked STG. ∆A, ∆D and ∆P are the 
percentage area, delay and power overheads, respectively. A 
negative percentage implies that watermarking has actually 
improved the performance. In general, more new transitions 
have been added onto the designs with 128-bit watermark than 
with 64-bit watermark. The performance overheads decrease as 
the size of FSM increases. For the six larger designs (twelve 
watermarked designs), the average area has increased by 4.23% 
but the average timing and power have actually improved by 
0.52% and 0.33%, respectively. It is conjecture that the 
watermarking overheads will become negligible for FSMs with 
many more states and input and output variables than those 
simulated. 
 
TABLE II  STATISTICS FOR ISCAS’89 AND IWLS’93 BENCHMARKS  
circuit |Q| n k A D P m N na ∆A ∆D ∆P 
64 600 2 3.9 5.7 -6.2 
s27 6 4 1 824 7 307 128 300 2 3.9 5.7 -6.2 
64 100 4 3.8 -9.2 6.0 
s208 18 11 2 1912 13 672 128 100 4 4.2 -9.2 10.3 
64 100 5 20.7 7.7 9.7 
s386 13 7 7 2512 13 842 128 600 5 22.6 10.8 15.2 
64 40 4 10.0 2.0 6.5 
s832 25 18 19 5144 19.8 1714 128 200 6 18.2 -4.0 16.2 
64 100 4 6.5 -3.3 2.8 
s510 47 19 7 5528 18.4 2021 128 200 7 13.5 -3.3 10.1 
64 200 3 -10.0 -4.9 -17.3 
s820 25 18 19 6112 20.6 2089 128 300 4 3.8 -2.9 -3.0 
64 200 2 3.0 5.2 10.8 
s1488 48 8 19 105 23 3391 128 300 4 5.9 1.7 12.8 
64 300 4 -0.4 -2.4 -6.5 
s1494 48 8 19 109 24.8 3746 128 300 5 8.3 -1.6 4.4 
64 600 3 8.6 -11.5 -4.7 bbara 10 4 2 1112 10.4 433 
128 600 5 17.3 -1.9 1.4 
64 500 1 0.6 4.0 4.3 dk15 8 3 5 1440 10 556 
128 500 1 8.9 12.0 2.7 
64 300 11 30.8 3.7 36.7 
ex4 14 6 9 1584 10.8 553 128 600 9 22.7 1.9 26.9 
64 400 4 10.0 11.0 4.9 
opus 10 5 6 1768 10.8 612 128 400 9 21.7 18.5 16.5 
64 400 3 16.3 11.5 15.1 
sse 16 7 7 2560 12.2 905 128 500 6 13.1 16.4 -2.5 
64 300 5 18.7 16.3 15.0 
ex1 20 9 19 4360 16 1439 128 200 10 32.5 20.0 22.2 
64 200 4 -7.5 1.2 -8.0 
s1 20 8 6 5112 16.6 1844 
128 500 7 9.4 21.7 4.7 
64 400 2 -2.4 3.1 -13.9 tbk 32 6 3 5352 19.6 1870 
128 200 6 0.0 -0.01 -14.7 
64 60 5 7.4 0.0 -4.2 
styr 30 9 10 8408 22.2 3028 128 200 5 3.0 -11.7 -1.2 
64 400 4 1.0 -13.7 -1.4 
sand 32 11 9 9096 24.8 3128 128 400 5 3.3 0.0 -6.5 
64 100 5 1.4 0.95 -3.5 planet 48 7 19 9784 21 3454 128 100 6 12.1 -2.9 7.9 
64 600 3 -7.0 -16.7 -16.0 
ram_test 72 16 24 9840 23.8 3563 128 600 4 -7.0 -10.1 -13.2 
64 400 13 11.8 9.2 0.8 
scf 121 27 56 12640 23.8 3705 
128 400 15 17.3 10.1 6.5 
 
According to (2), the probabilities of coincidence, Pc  = 5.42 
×10−20 and 2.49×10−39 for m = 64 and 128, respectively. The 
false positive rate P
λ
 is determined empirically by applying 1000 
randomly generated input code sequences of length N onto each 
watermarked FSM at the watermarked starting state. None of the 
output sequence was detected with a perfectly matched 
watermark for each watermarked FSM, i.e., P
λ
(τ = 1) = 0 for all 
watermarked designs. It is thought to be reasonable that a 
sufficiently low probability is adequate to prove the authorship 
and make the denial attacks unsustainable. Hence, we reduce the 
watermark correlation from 100% to 75% match. It was found 
that for τ = 0.75, P
λ
 = 0 for all the watermarked designs. When τ 
is reduced to 0.7, only a small number of watermarked designs 
has P
λ 
> 0. Based on these results, it is reasonable to assume that 
when more than three quarters of watermark bits are matched, 
the authorship proof is still veracious.      
We used the SIS tool and the same technology library to 
synthesize the designs watermarked by the method in [14] and 
compared their areas and delays with those of our proposed 
(abbreviated as Prop.) FSM watermarking method in Table III. 
∆A, ∆D and ∆P are the percentage reductions of area, delay and 
power, respectively, of our proposed scheme over those of [14]. 
It is evident that most designs watermarked by our method have 
lower area, timing and power overheads. 
 
TABLE III  COMPARISON WITH FSM WATERMARKING METHOD IN [14] 
Area Delay Power 
circuit m [14] Prop. ∆A [14] Prop. ∆D [14] Prop. ∆P 
64 1064 856 19.6 7.8 7.4 5.1 411 288 30 
s27 128 1064 856 19.6 7.8 7.4 5.1 411 288 30 
64 3680 1984 46.1 15.8 11.8 25.3 1314 712 45.8 
s208 
128 5248 1992 62.0 19.8 11.8 40.4 1968 741 62.3 
64 3976 3032 23.7 17.8 14.0 12.5 1257 923. 26.6 
s386 128 4592 3080 32.9 16.2 14.4 11.1 1479 970 34.4 
64 6256 5656 9.6 21.0 20.2 3.8 1939 1826 5.83 
s832 128 6904 6080 11.9 21.6 19.0 12.0 2026 1991 1.73 
64 7272 5888 19.0 21.2 17.8 16.0 2641 2077 21.4 
s510 128 7816 6272 19.8 19.4 17.8 8.2 2805 2226 20.6 
64 6208 5504 11.3 20.6 19.6 4.9 1944 1727 11.2 
s820 128 7352 6344 47.0 21.4 20.0 6.5 2183 2025 7.24 
64 12032 10864 9.7 23.2 24.2 -4.3 3877 3758 3.07 
s1488 128 14120 11168 20.9 25.6 23.4 8.6 4399 3825 13.0 
64 12488 10856 13.1 29.0 24.2 16.6 4166 3503 15.9 
s1494 
128 12816 11808 7.9 25.2 24.4 3.2 4143 3912 5.58 
64 2512 1208 51.9 13.2 9.2 30.3 888 412 53.6 bbara 
128 2512 1304 48.1 13.2 10.2 22.7 888 439 50.6 
64 2104 1448 31.2 11.6 10.4 10.3 738 581 21.3 dk15 128 2504 1568 37.4 13.6 11.2 17.6 946 571 39.6 
64 2104 2072 1.5 11.4 11.2 1.8 756 756 0.0 
ex4 128 3008 1944 35.4 13.0 11.0 15.4 1077 702 34.8 
64 4216 2976 29.4 15.4 13.6 11.7 1474 1041 29.4 
sse 128 4496 2896 35.6 15.2 14.2 6.6 1460 882 39.6 
64 5632 5176 8.1 16.0 18.6 -16.3 1764 1654 6.24 
ex1 128 6056 5776 4.6 18.4 19.2 -4.3 1880 1758 6.49 
64 5760 4728 17.9 16.8 16.8 0.0 2109 1695 19.6 
s1 
128 7376 5592 24.2 19.6 20.2 -3.1 2675 1935 27.7 
64 8944 9184 -2.68 20.4 21.4 4.9 3013 3086 2.37 
sand 
128 10952 9392 14.2 21.6 24.8 -14.8 3674 2925 20.4 
64 11552 9920 16.5 22.6 21.2 6.2 3787 3332 12.0 planet 
128 11712 10968 6.35 25.2 20.4 19.0 4064 3725 8.34 
64 9240 9032 2.25 25.0 22.2 11.2 3014 2900 3.78 
styr 128 10216 8656 15.3 24.2 19.6 19.0 3407 2992 12.2 
64 13568 14128 -4.1 24.4 26 -6.6 3679 3733 -1.5 
scf 128 13880 14824 -6.8 22.8 26.2 -14.9 3625 3945 -8.8 
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We also compared our watermarking method with Oliveira’s 
[12] FSM watermarking scheme in Table IV. As the same 
synthesis tool and technology library were used, the area and 
delay results are excerpted from [12] for those circuits provided 
with both BLIF and KISS2 formats in the benchmark suite and 
have comparable literal counts in their original designs before 
watermarking. In Table IV, the area is measured in terms of the 
number of literals to be consistent with [12].  All designs 
watermarked by our method have consistently lower area and 
timing overheads than [12]. It should also be noted that the 
watermarking method of [12] does not survive the state 
reduction operation (cf. III.B.3). 
 
 TABLE IV  COMPARISON WITH FSM WATERMARKING METHOD IN [12] 
Area Delay Circuit M [12] proposed ∆A (%) [12] proposed ∆D (%) 
64 297 51 82.8 21.8 7.4 66.1 
s27 128 541 51 90.6 25.4 7.4 70.9 
64 308 164 46.8 15.6 11.8 24.4 
s208 128 441 170 61.5 19.8 11.8 40.4 
64 444 248 44.1 17.8 14.0 21.3 
s386 128 644 258 59.9 23.0 14.4 37.4 
64 879 247 71.9 34.6 13.4 61.3 
s499 128 1230 308 75.0 39.6 16.4 58.6 
64 680 486 28.5 22.2 20.2 9.0 
s832 
128 804 518 35.6 24.4 19.0 22.1 
64 581 512 11.9 20.6 17.8 13.6 
s510 128 688 545 20.8 21.0 17.8 15.2 
64 669 463 30.8 26.4 19.6 25.8 
s820 128 814 539 33.8 24.0 20.0 16.7 
64 1318 968 26.6 33.4 24.2 27.5 
s1488 128 1495 981 34.4 31.0 23.4 24.5 
64 1329 945 28.9 32.8 24.2 26.2 
s1494 128 1547 1050 32.1 31.4 24.4 22.3 
 
In Table V, we also compare our FSM watermarking method 
with the FSM watermarking method [13]. For consistency, the 
designs are watermarked with the same length of watermark as 
[13] and synthesized using the same MSU script [23] from SIS. 
The watermark length “m” used by [13] is design dependent and 
can be determined by the product of the number of output 
variables |∆| of the watermarked design and the minimum 
number of watermarked transitions nmin needed to satisfy the 
required probability of coincidence (Pu in [13]).  It is evident that 
our method incurs lower area overhead than [13] for the same 
constraint on the watermark robustness. Note here that no delay 
statistics are provided in [13] to compare with. 
 
TABLE V  COMPARISON WITH FSM WATERMARKING METHOD IN [13] 
Area Circuit m [13] proposed ∆A (%) 
s27 36 1.53k 0.62k 59.5 
bbara 30 2.01k 1.05k 47.8 
dk14 35 1.84k 1.74k 5.4 
styr 40 10.69k 7.54k 29.5 
bbsse 70 2.62k 2.46k 6.1 
cse 35 4.08k 3.62k 11.3 
sse 21 2.43k 2.34k 3.7 
ex1 76 5.55k 4.38k 21.1 
ex1 38 5.40k 4.06k 24.8 
scf 112 21.02k 14.4k 31.5 
 
As SIS tool can only read STG in KISS2 format, to show the 
applicability of our method on large designs, we use GenFSM 
[28] to generate ten arbitrary STGs of hundreds to thousands of 
transitions for experimentation by specifying the number of 
inputs/outputs and states. These FSMs can all be watermarked 
by the proposed method within one second. The synthesis results 
are shown in Table VI, where the column “T” is the number of 
transitions of the generated FSM. The largest design has an area 
of 47721 literals which is much larger than the largest design in 
[12], which has only 19258 literals. On average, for the128-bit 
watermark, the area increases by 0.16%, and the delay and 
power decreases by 2.1% and 0.4%, respectively.   
 
TABLE VI  STATISTICS OF WATERMARKING ON FSMS GENERATED BY 
GENFSM 
FSM n k |Q| T A D P m ∆A ∆D ∆P 
64 -0.0 17.0 -3.8 F1 5 10 10 320 2415 35.2 4456 128 -0.6 5.1 -5.6 
64 2.3 3.2 0.18 F2 5 10 14 448 3063 37 6022 128 0.8 2.16 -0.25 
64 1.25 -5.57 -1.30 F3 3 8 80 640 3990 68.2 5217 128 0.10 -17.6 -3.05 
64 -0.62 -8.05 8.14 F4 3 7 100 800 4552 69.6 5983 128 1.10 -8.3 7.24 
64 -1.18 -2.79 -1.38 F5 3 7 200 1600 8875 43 11054 128 0.7 -5.12 -0.62 
64 0.03 -0.5 -2.05 F6 3 6 300 2400 11625 40.2 13826 128 -0.66 0.5 -1.5 
64 0.79 -0.44 -1.51 F7 3 6 350 2800 13249 45.4 15516 128 0.34 1.32 -1.64 
64 -0.32 -2.3 0.14 F8 3 5 400 3200 14275 44 16290 
128 -0.29 -2.3 0.84 
64 0.12 1.98 -0.31 F9 4 5 500 8000 38388 100.8 39845 
128 -0.02 2.18 0.11 
64 0.31 -4.31 1.07 F10 4 5 600 9600 47721 102 46751 
128 0.24 1.18 0.11 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a new robust dynamic watermarking 
scheme by embedding the authorship information on the 
transitions of STG at the behavioral synthesis level. The 
proposed method offers a high degree of tamper resistance and 
provides an easy and noninvasive copy detection. The FSM 
watermark is highly resilient to all conceivable watermark 
removal attacks.  The redundancy in the FSM has been 
effectively utilized to minimize the embedding overhead. By 
increasing the length of input code sequence for watermark 
retrieval and allowing the output compatible transitions to be 
revisited to embed different watermark bits, the watermarks are 
more randomly dispersed and better concealed in the existing 
transitions of FSM. The new approach to the logic state 
assignments of pseudo input variables also makes it infeasible to 
attack the watermarked FSM by removing the pseudo inputs. 
Without compromising the watermark strength, the length of 
verification code sequence can be adapted to reduce the area 
overhead of watermarked design to a reasonable bound within a 
preset number of iterations. Our experimental results show that 
the watermarking incurs acceptably low performance overheads 
and possesses very low possibility of coincidence and false 
positive rate.  
Similar to other FSM watermarking schemes [12]-[14], this 
method is not applicable to some ultra high speed designs that do 
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not have an FSM. Fortunately, regular sequential functions are 
omnipresent in industrial designs [13], making FSM 
watermarking a key research focus for dynamic 
watermarking. One recommendation to overcome such 
limitation is to augment it with combinational watermarking 
scheme [5] applied simultaneously or on different levels of 
design abstraction to realize hierarchical watermarking [9], [10].  
The watermarked FSM can be fortified by a scan chain 
watermarking [16], [17] to enable the authorship to be easily 
verified even after the protected IP has been packaged. While the 
robustness of the authorship proof lies mainly on the 
watermarked FSM, the auxiliary post-synthesis scan-chain 
reordering serves as an intruder-alert for the misappropriation of 
sequential design under test and increases the effort level 
required to successfully forge a testable IP without being 
detected.  Even if the scan chain is removed or deranged by the 
aggressor, the more robust FSM watermark remains intact and 
detectable on chip.  
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